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ESSAY
GRISWOLD AND ITS SURROUNDINGS: THE
1963, '64, AND '65 TERMS
L.A. POWE,JR.*
There were four dominant themes of the mature-postFrankfurter-Warren Court. First and foremost was ending Jim Crow
in the South, a project that began with Brown v. Board of Education.'
Second was promoting democracy through "one person, one vote." 2
The third was the reform of the criminal justice system by requiring it
to conform to national best practices. The last theme was expanding
freedom of expression by ending McCarthy-era persecutions,
liberating the depiction of sex from the Victorian Era ideal, and
guaranteeing the right to vigorously criticize government.3 Of course
there was considerable overlap among the themes, a point especially
clear in the case of race and the criminal justice system. What makes

* Anne Green Regents Chair, University of Texas.

1. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that public educational facilities
inherently could not be "separate but equal," and such schools in fact violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection).
2.
See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can only mean one
thing-one person, one vote."); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964)
(concluding that to allow one vote to hold greater weight than another is
unconstitutional); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (confirming that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects voting rights and that courts can decide the
constitutionality of a state's redistricting when it impacts voting rights).
3. See LucAs A. POWEJR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITIcs 316, 32230, 339-41 (2000) [hereinafter THE WARREN COURT] (explaining that the decline of
the Red Scare, civilian protests surrounding the Vietnam war, and the Civil Rights
Movement all contributed to a more liberal interpretation of the First Amendment).
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Griswold v. Connecticut stand out so sharply is that it does not involve
any of these themes and that it led to no further Warren Court
decisions on the issue. The latter point is not surprising, as only the
three New England states where the Catholic Church held undue
influence had anti-contraceptive laws, and the Church, holding a
losing hand, immediately capitulated.5 Thereafter, private entities
like Planned Parenthood could offer contraception.
So how does Griswold fit in with the Warren Court, if it fits in at all?
To explore that question I will look at the 1964 Term (in which the
Court decided Griswold) and the Terms immediately before and
after.6 I have limited the data to the Terms on each side of Griswold
for a couple of reasons. First, the 1963 Term was the coming
together of the liberal five-man majority,7 confident in America and
their own abilities to improve it.8 Second, the 1965 Term marks the
last Term before the constant summer race riots' and deepening war
in Vietnam soured the liberal mood in the country. As a result, the
1966 mid-term elections produced sweeping Republican victories.
THE

1963 TERM

Anthony Lewis, then the Supreme Court correspondent of the New
York Times, called the 1963 Term the "[S]econd American
Constitutional Convention.""0 He caught its spirit and actions perfectly.
The 1963 Term was a Term of blockbuster decisions, and there are no
back-to-back volumes of the U.S. Reports that can match 377 and 378. "

4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Constitution provides married couples
a right to contraception).

5. See THE WARREN COURT, supra note 3, at 376 (noting that in 1964, three-quarters
of American Catholics were in support of freely available advice about contraceptives).
6. It is well to remember that the Court's Terms were different fifty years ago.
The Court routinely decided twice as many cases on the merits as it does today, and
one could expect almost twenty important constitutional decisions per Term. Tracey
E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts' of
Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1440-41 (2009).
7. Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas, William J. Brennan and
Arthur Goldberg (and then Abe Fortas replacing him).
8.

See generally THE WARREN COURT, supra note 3, at 209-16 (recognizing that

the Warren Court had a liberal majority, "men of action, ready to act," and thus often
took on controversial cases).
9. There were race riots in Harlem (1964) and Watts (1965), but they were
isolated. In 1966 and 1967, they became widespread.
10. ANTHONY LEWIS, THE WARREN COURT:
Schwartz, ed. 1996).

A RETROSPECTrVE 398 (Bernard

11. LA Powe,Jr., October Term 1963: 'The Second American ConstitutionalConvention",38J.
Sup. CT.HIsr. 194 (2013) [hereinafter The Second American ConstitutionalConvention].

2015]

GRISWOLD AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

1445

The biggest case of the Term was Reynolds v. Sim,' 2 the follow up to
the two-year-old Baker v. Carr.'3 Alabama had not redistricted in six
decades, and all observers of legislative apportionment believed, as
Solicitor General Archibald Cox argued, that Reynolds was going to
hold what was implicit in Baker-that at least one house of a bicameral
state legislature had to be apportioned on an equal population basis,
but that the second house could bear a resemblance to the United
States Senate. 4 What was not anticipated was that the Court would
reject the Senate analogy and instead hold that both houses had to be
apportioned on an equal population basis. Furthermore, to show how
serious the Court was, in a companion case out of Colorado, the Court
applied its "one person, one vote" rule to a brand new state
constitution that had been approved by the voters of every single
county in the state (under circumstances where voters could have
adopted a different constitution with equal apportionment in both
houses).' 5 The result of Reynolds meant that every state was going to
undergo new redistricting in the not-so-distant future. It also took
reapportionment off the docket, pending those legislative actions.
A second major case of the Tern was Escobedo v. Illinois, 6 where the
dissenters claimed "the goal which the Court seemingly has in mind [is]
to bar from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual
suspected of crime, whether involuntary or not." 7 A 5-4 majority issued
an opinion that indeed radiated hostility toward confessions (and the
police).'" The majority announced it had "learned the lesson of history,
ancient and modem, that a system of criminal law enforcement which
comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less
reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on
extrinsic evidence secured through skillful investigation."19 The Court

12. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that if a state's redistricting impacts voting
rights, then ajusticiable constitutional cause of action exists through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
14. THE WARREN COURT, supra note 3, at 246.
15. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731, 736-37 (1964)
(striking down a Colorado constitutional amendment allowing for apportionment of
state senate election districts as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution).
16. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
17. Id. at 495.
18. Id. at 490-91 (holding that an individual's Sixth Amendment rights were
violated when he was taken into custody, interrogated, and denied the opportunity to
consult with his attorney).
19. Id. at 488-89.

1446

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1443

then suggested that police "often" extort confessions "to save law
enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid
independent evidence."20 The Court continued its attack on confessions
and law enforcement with another "we have learned":
We have also learned the lesson of history that no system of
criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend on the
citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional
rights ....If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system.2"

Escobedo was not the only major criminal procedure case the
Court confronted during the 1963 Term. The Court also ruled
that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was
applicable to the states, 22 and affirmed a preference for search
warrants over police discretion. 3 In the latter case, the Court
when police claim to
tightened the standards for issuing warrants
21
informant.
unnamed
an
on
be relying
Another landmark case, instantly beloved by the media, was New York
Times v. Sullivan,25 which constitutionalized the law of libel of public
officials and declared the long-dead Sedition Act of 1798 to have been
a First Amendment infringement. The Court also moved obscenity law
from Roth v. United States,26 which was designed to protect all great
literature, to Jacobellis v. Ohio,27 which guaranteed that all serious
literature would be protected, as a summary 5-4 reversal of an
obscenity finding against Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancerillustrated. 28
In 1964, the Court commenced its destruction of the federal domestic
security program. The Subversive Activities Control Act required
20. Id. at 490 (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963)).
21. Id.
22. Malloyv. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
23. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (noting that the constitutionality of
a search warrant should be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate rather
than left to the discretion of police officers) abrogatedby Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983) (totality of the circumstances test).
24. See id. at 113-14 (holding that the search warrant issued was not supported
by probable cause because the affidavit contained no allegation that the affiant had
personal knowledge of the defendant's criminal activity and because the magistrate
accepted the informant's "mere conclusion" without question).
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
27. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
28. Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964) (upholding a strict
standard of review when evaluating the scope of expression protected by the United
States Constitution) (citingJacobeis,378 U.S. at 195)).
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registration of the Communist Party and its members with the
Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) (after the SACB found the
Party to be a "Communist-action" organization) and created penalties
for noncompliance.2' In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the first case since
the Court upheld the decision of the SACB to require registration, the
Court held that officers of the Communist Party could not have their
passports revoked when the Party refused to disclose its members."
The race cases were all re-runs. NAACP v. Alabama 2 was before the
Court for the fourth and final time.3"
An exasperated Court
informed the Alabama Supreme Court that if it would not accept its
final defeat, the Court would enter its own decree A la Martin v.
Hunter'sLessee.3" Griffin v. PrinceEdward County35 was one of Brown v.
Board of Education's companion cases. By 1964, Prince Edward was
the sole county remaining in Virginia without public schools (having
abolished them as part of "Massive Resistance"). That was an easy
equal protection violation. More significantly, the Court authorized
the federal district court, if need be, to levy taxes to support the
schools that were ordered to open.
6
Bell v. Maryland&
was the Justices' hardest sit-in case to date because,
try as they might, they could not find a state or local law that could be
deemed to authorize the segregation that the storeowner practiced.3"
After months of delay and wrangling, Justice Brennan created a
majority opinion that reversed the trespass convictions on the basis of a
new public accommodations law passed after the convictions had been
affirmed, certiorari granted, and the case argued. " This was not pretty
at all, but as Justice Brennan told his clerks near the end of the Bell
wrangling (and many subsequent times): "Five votes can do anything

29.
30.

Subversive Activities Control Act, Pub. L. No. 831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
378 U.S. 500 (1964).

31.

Id. at 534.

32. 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
33. THE WARREN COURT, supra note 3, at 166-67 (noting that the Alabama
Supreme Court repeatedly frustrated the United States Supreme Court's holding,
forcing the NAACP to repeatedly return to the Supreme Court for relief).
34. 14 U.S. 304, 351-52 (1816) (affirming the Court's power to override state
courts and to enter a final judgment).
35. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
36. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
37. See id. at 230, 232-33 (noting that the law under which the petitioners were
charged was subsequently abolished and "now vindicates their conduct and recognizes
it as the exercise of a right, directing the law's prohibition not at them but at the
restaurant owner or manager who seeks to deny them service because of their race").

38.

Id. at 242.
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around here."39 Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren had been
worried that any other decision in a sit-in case could adversely affect
Congressional action on the Civil Rights Act, which received Senate
approval immediately before Bell came down.
THE

1964 TERM

Easily the most important case from the 1964 Term was Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States," sustaining the Civil Rights Act less than
six months after President Johnson signed it into law. The (nowdemolished) motel sat at the intersection of two interstate highways
and served an interstate clientele."' However, the motel refused to
rent rooms to black patrons. Ultimately, the Court held that
Congress could use the Commerce Clause to compel private
2
businesses to comply with the Civil Rights Act."

Two companion cases stretched the Commerce Clause rationale.
One case involved Ollie's Barbeque in Birmingham, located eleven
blocks from the interstate and unlikely to be serving travelers. 3
Solicitor General Cox suggested that the United States had not yet
enforced the Civil Rights Act against the owners and that the Court
did not have jurisdiction.
However, the Justices brushed his
argument aside to get to the merits. They ruled that the $69,000 (out
of $150,000) worth of meat that came from out of state brought
Ollie's under the Act. 44

The Court wrote that African Americans

spent significantly less time in areas with racially segregated
restaurants and that, in turn, restricted commerce. Yet, the African
Americans turned away by Ollie's and other establishments would still
have to eat, and their food would be equally likely to have come from
another state. The message of the case was that, contrary to the
statutory language of the Act, the Act covered everyone.

39. Stephen R. Barnett & Stephen J. Friedman, "Notes," Opinions of William J.
Brennan, Jr., October Term, 1963, at xxvi (on file in William J. Brennan Papers, Library
of Congress). See Nat Hentoff, The Constitutionalist,NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 1990, 12:37
PM), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1990/03/12/the-constitutionalist
("There
is also the five-finger speech. It generally comes when a new clerk asks, in dismay and
outrage, how a majority of the Court has arrived at a decision he or she feels is flagrantly
unjust. Justice Brennan holds up his hand, wriggles his five fingers, and says, 'Five votes.
Five votes can do anything around here."').
40. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
41.
Id.at 243.
42. Id. at 261.
43. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1964).
44. Id. at 296, 304.
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Bell v. Maryland was not, in fact, the last sit-in case the Court heard;
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill5 was. A 5-4 majority vacated the convictions
and ordered the indictments dismissed under the doctrine of
abatement. There were two problems. First, there was not a shred of
evidence that Congress intended or even thought that passage of the
Civil Rights Act would abate pre-existing criminal convictions of the
highest court in a state. Second, how the power to regulate interstate
commerce now and in the future is affected by a pre-existing criminal
conviction is impossible to explain-and was therefore left unexplained.
The answer had to be that the Court was treating the Act as wiping
everything clean (whether or not Congress had the power to do so).
6
the Court took up an issue it had
In McLaughlin v. Florida,"
studiously ducked a decade earlier" 7 -criminalizing interracial sex.
The majority opinion was interesting because it took the stance of
looking for a sufficient justification for the law rather than simply
stating, as Justices Stewart and Douglas did, that a criminal law that
turns on race is per se unconstitutional."8 McLaughlin marked the last
time the NAACP Legal Defense Fund cited the first Justice John
Marshall Harlan's Plessy v. Ferguson" dissent for the proposition that
the Constitution was colorblind.5"
The other important race cases were also First Amendment cases.
With the Civil Rights Movement still in full swing, demonstrators
advocating equal rights often found themselves in conflict with law
enforcement and ordinances regulating assembly. In 1961, the
Reverend Elton Cox led some two thousand demonstrators in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana from a restaurant they were picketing to the
courthouse. None were arrested during the demonstration, but Cox
was subsequently convicted of breaching the peace, obstructing
public passageways, and picketing at a courthouse.5 1 The Court easily
reversed the breach of the peace conviction, reasoning that the

45. 379 U.S. 306, 308 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids
discrimination in places of public accommodation).
46. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
47. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956) (declining to hear the case because
the parties did not articulate a properly presented federal question); Naim v. Naim, 350
U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam) (declining to hear the case because of inadequacies
in the record);Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888, 888 (1954) (denying certiorari).
48. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93, 196 (1964) (majority opinion);
see also id. at 198 (StewartJ., concurring).
49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
50. ANDREw KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 170 (1992).

51.

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538 (1965).
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demonstration was peaceful.5 2 The Court also reversed the second
conviction, reasoning that officials administered the statute as a
standard-less licensing scheme, something long held unconstitutional.53
The courthouse picketing statute was unanimously deemed constitutional,
but the conviction was also reversed because a majority on de novo review
concluded that the police chief had given the demonstrators permission
to be there.54 The Court's position in Cox seemed to somewhat conflict
with a decision two years earlier, where the Court had described a
55
demonstration of 150 people at the South Carolina capital as "pristine."
In Cox, the Court, even as it reversed the convictions, warned that "liberty
56
itself would be lost in the excess of anarchy.'
The Court further cleared the path for the Civil Rights Movement by
holding that the First Amendment prohibited the threat of
57
prosecution for certain expressive activity. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,
the Supreme Court considered whether Louisiana officials had
abused anti-communism laws to chill the Southern Conference
Education Fund's civil rights efforts.58 The Fund claimed that the
state was threatening prosecutions for which it had no hope of
securing valid convictions, and the threats were bringing the
organizations activities to a halt. 5'

The chairman of the state's

UnAmerican Activities Committee stated that arrests had been for
racial agitation.'

Justice Brennan authorized an injunction against

the state because "the chilling effect upon the exercise of First
Amendment rights may derive from the fact of prosecution,
unaffected by the prospects of success or failure."6' On its face, Pfister
offered a powerful tool to civil rights groups fighting a determined,
and all-too-often unlawful, Deep South resistance.
In dissent, Justice Harlan made a federalism argument and asked what
if the organization was really "conspiring to stage a forcible coup d'iftat?"'62
It might have improved the government of Louisiana at the time.
Leaving the South and civil rights, the Court decided two domestic
security cases involving two federal statutes, one with a real
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 545-46.
Id. 556-58.
Id. at 564, 569-70.
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 229-30, 235 (1963).
379 U.S. at 554, 558.
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 487-89.
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 487 n.4.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 502 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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63
communist and the other, a fellow-traveler. United States v. Brown
concerned the Taft-Hartley Act, which required union leaders to
affirm that they were not members of the Communist Party if the
union wished to avail itself to the protections of the National Labor
Relations Act. Congress had rationalized that Communists were far
more likely to engage in political-rather than economic-strikes,
which presented an inherent conflict of interest with union
leadership. Chief Justice Warren found the requirement to be a bill
of attainder because Congress was finding the Communist Party and
its members prematurely guilty of a crime.' Stripping them of their
union positions was, therefore, punishment. The opinion was
both novel and unsatisfying because conflict of interest provisions
are presumably valid. 6 Chief Justice Warren attempted to finesse
the point by stressing the fact that the Communist Party was
specifically named in the legislation.6"
The other case, Lamont v. Post Master General,67 involved Corliss
Lamont, an American socialist philosopher and civil liberties
advocate,6 8 and a recently passed statute that barred the Post Office
from delivering "communist political propaganda" via second class
mail to an address, unless the addressee had communicated a desire
to receive such mail." Justice Douglas's majority opinion assumed
there was a First Amendment right to receive ideas; Justice Brennan
in concurrence made that explicit. This was the first "live" federal
statute to be declared a violation of the expression clauses.
The final First Amendment case of the Term killed public movie
censorship boards by demanding they take on the burden of proof, be
responsible for initiating judicial review, and to do so quickly."0 No
boards had either the staff or the money to meet the new procedural
requirements, so these staples of Twentieth Century history passed

63. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
64. Id. at 449-50.
65. Note, The Bill of Attainder Clauses and Legislative and Administrative
Suppression of "Subversives", 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1490, 1497 (1967) (noting that the
ambiguous holding of United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), led to
conflicting decisions in the lower courts).
66. Brown, 381 U.S. at 450.
67. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
68. See generally Robert D. McFadden, Corliss Lamont Dies at 93; Socialist Battled
McCarthy, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 28, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/28/
obituaries/corliss-lamont-dies-at-93-socialist-battled-mccarthy.html?pagewan ted=2.
69. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302.
70. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).

1452

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1443

from the scene and were replaced at the end of the decade by a ratings
system fashioned by the Motion Picture Association of America."
The 1964 Term's criminal procedure cases were a mixed bag. The
previous Term's decision to incorporate the privilege against self72 when
incrimination bore fruit in Griffin v. California,
the Court
applied the federal rule to the states that prosecutors cannot
comment on the choice of the defendant not to testify.73 The Court
also incorporated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial
against the states in Pointerv. Texas."4
In Estes v. Texas,75 the petitioner, Billie Sol Estes-Texas wheelerdealer and sometime Lyndon B. Johnson business partner-claimed
that the state of Texas had violated his Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process by allowing live radio and television broadcasts of his
pre-trial hearing on swindling charges. Over impassioned dissents,
claiming that cameras do not per se deny the right to a fair trial, the
Court overturned his convictions, holding that his trial was
fundamentally unfair because "there had been a bombardment of the
76
community with the sights and sounds" of the petitioner's trial.
In light of the Court's assault on racial discrimination in the South,
Swain v. Alabama77 is all but inexplicable. In Swain, the state of
Alabama had convicted an African-American defendant of raping a
white woman and sentenced him to death. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the defendant challenged the state's peremptory
challenges to strike six eligible African-Americans from the jury
venire in an area where no living person could remember an AfricanAmerican ever being on a jury. 78 Since peremptory challenges had a
long pedigree and could be used for any or no reason, the Court
sided with the prosecution. The Court explained that "[w]ith these
considerations in mind, we cannot hold that the striking of Negroes
in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the
quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant
' 79
and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause.
The Court's claim that banning peremptory challenges based on race

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Roy Eugene Bates, PrivateGensmorship ofMovies, 22 STAN. L. REv. 618,620-21 (1970).
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id.at 615.
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Id. at 538.
380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See id. at 222-23.
Id. at 221.
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would be a "radical change," ° rang hollow a year after the Court's
influential decision in Reynolds v. Sims,"' in which the Court held that
legislative districts across states be equal in population. 2
Finally, in Linkletter v. Walker,8 3 the Court came to grips with the fact that

its criminal procedure revolution could empty American jails of their
criminal population because, previously, all constitutional decisions were
fully retroactive. But no longer. The majority riled that its decision to
require states to follow the exclusionary rule8" applied only to cases on
direct review where the judgment was not final. Justices Hugo Black and
William 0. Douglas thought the majority behaved lawlessly.
Then came Griswold, which marked the third time the Connecticut
birth control statute had been before the Court, but the first time the
Court reached the merits. The "third time's the charm," apparently.
In 1943, in the wake of the New Deal revolution, the Court held that
a group of doctors did not have standing to challenge the law.85 In
1961, a woman, who gave birth to three babies who died shortly after,
filed suit alongside the doctors, and the standing problem was
apparently solved. 6 However, Justice Frankfurter convinced a bare
majority that state penal statutes cannot be subject to a constitutional
challenge "if real threat of enforcement is wanting."8 7 He noted that
since 1879, the state had only initiated one prosecution, apparently a
test case, which was dismissed after the state court decision. Justice
Clark, who had voted against noting probable jurisdiction, was happy
to join: "Good riddance! Join me up."8 8 Justice Brennan provided
the fifth vote, reasoning that the statute would only prevent birth
control clinics from opening; it would not prevent married couples
from obtaining contraceptives by other means. He wrote that the
Court would not review the statute until the State made "a definite

80. Id. at 221-22 (warning that such a holding would leave "each and every
[peremptory] challenge open to examination ... and a great many uses of the
challenge would be banned").
81. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (requiring every state legislative body to reflect
"one person, one vote"); see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
82. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.
83. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
84. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
85. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
86. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
87. Id. at 507.
88. TCC to Felix [Frankfurter], June 6, 1961, Tom Clark Papers, Box A109,
Folder 11, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas School of Law.
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and concrete threat to enforce these laws against individual married
couples,"89 which finally occurred in Griswold.
By the time Griswold arrived before the Court, the Justices were
familiar with the issue. They all voted to note probable jurisdiction
and then got on with the opinion writing. In 1961 it took almost three
months for the decision; four years later it took barely two months.
Justice Douglas had his penumbras and emanations and ended with a
praise of marriage-something that he could never find in his private
life. Justice Goldberg "found" the Ninth Amendment. Justice Harlan
saw in Due Process the evolving standard he could never find in Equal
Protection. Justice White rested on the irrationality of Connecticut's
belief that no contraception would limit illicit sex. And, of course,
Justices Black and Stewart had their curt, biting dissents.90
Whether Griswold would generate future decisions was unclear.
The case was best summarized by its winning counsel, Yale law
professor Thomas I. Emerson, with his pithy title "Nine Justices in
Search of a Doctrine."'" Yet, eight years later, its right of privacy was
the constitutional basis for Roe v. Wade 2 and, twenty-two years later,
Judge Robert Bork's opposition to Griswold was one factor in the
Senate's rejecting his Supreme Court nomination by President
Reagan. Anthony Kennedy's replacing Bork saved Roe and laid the
groundwork for the protection of same-sex marriage.
THE 1965 TERM

Reynolds v. Sims and its companions were redistricting, not voting
rights cases, and they took redistricting off the docket for several years.
The 1965 Term instead featured three voting rights cases, two flowing
from and sustaining the recently passed Voting Rights Act. South
Carolinav. Katzenbach 3 dealt with the Act generally: the elimination of
literacy tests, the creation of federal registrars, and the requirement
that affected states get the approval of the federal government before
any state or local changes in voting could go into effect."1 The Court
accepted Congress's findings that many voting requirements were
racially discriminatory and all past remedial measures had had been
89.
90.

Poe, 367 U.S. at 509.
The most complete study is DAvIDJ. GARROW,

LIBERKYAND SEXUALIY. THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994). The most recent commentary is Ryan
C. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2155 (2014).
91. Thomas I. Emerson, NineJustices in Search ofa Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 219 (1965).
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
94. See id. at 312, 315-16, 334-37.
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ineffectual. Congress "chose to limit its attention to the geographic
areas where immediate action seemed necessary": Southern states. 95
Drawing on McCulloch v. Maryland," the Court stated that Congress
could use "any rational means to effectuate 9 7the constitutional
prohibition" of discrimination on the basis of race.
8 was a companion case that dealt with a
Katzenbach v. Morgan"
provision of the Act that enfranchised non-English speakers who had a
sixth grade education in a Puerto Rican school where the instruction
was in Spanish. Unlike the Voting Rights Act provisions at issue in
Katzenbach, there was no voluminous legislative history; there was no
legislative history at all. Furthermore, the Court had previously
recognized that English literacy could be a rational requirement for
voting.99 Without overruling that case, the Court stated its task was not
determining whether New York's English literacy requirement was
constitutional, but instead, determining whether the federal
displacement was "appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause."' ° The Court then sustained the law as protecting
Spanish speakers from discrimination by the state.' 0 ' But it also went
on to apparently give Congress an independent power to interpret the
02
Constitution and prevail over the contrary conclusion of the Court.1
Understanding the implications of its conclusion, the Court dropped a
footnote, stating that this was a power only to enhance, not restrict,
rights.' O3 The Court might have asked the English-speaking New
Yorkers how they liked their voting power diluted by the addition of
several hundred thousand voters who did not speak English. 104
95.
96.

Id. at 328.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

97. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
98.
384 U.S. 641 (1966), abrogated in part by Shelby County. v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
99. Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-54 (1959).
100. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650.
101.
Id. at 657-58.
102. See id. at 648 n.8 (The Due Process Clause "enables Congress, in case the
States shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct
that legislation by a formal congressional enactment") (internal citations omitted).
103. Id. at 651-52 n.10 ("We emphasize that Congress'[s] power under § 5 is
limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.").
104. The sentence in the text is harsh. But consider a modern analogy: suppose
Congress, relying on Morgan and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (states cannot
deny undocumented children K-12 public education), decides to enfranchise all
adults who have resided in the United States for twelve months. Many affected
citizens would believe their votes were being diluted.
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Another great victory for voting rights came when the Justices took
on poll taxes. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified without a
single Southern state, abolished the poll tax in federal elections. The
Voting Rights Act directed the Justice Department to challenge the
poll tax in state elections; a year later, poll taxes were gone.' 5 In
Harperv. Virginia Board ofElections,10 6 the Court declared that voting was
a fundamental right and could not be conditioned on paying the
annual $1.50 tax.'" 7 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, explained
that "[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's
ability" to cast an intelligent ballot.'08 Thus, "[1]ines drawn on the basis
of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored," '
a tradition dating from the day Harper came down. Douglas bnshed
aside both originalism and precedent with a single assertive sentence
carrying its own emphasis:
"Notions of what constitutes equal
10
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change."
With these three cases, the Justices demonstrated their commitment to
promoting robust democratic participation.
The Court's protections against Southern discrimination continued in
Evans v. Newton"' and Brown v. Louisiana"2 (although both cases would
be eroded in the firture). The former involved a segregated park in
Macon created by former Georgia Senator Augustus Bacon in the early
years of the century with the city being the trustee. After Brown v. Board of
Education,"' the city realized it could no longer operate the park on a
segregated basis, and so it petitioned a state court to appoint private
trustees instead. The Court thought it still looked like Macon was
maintaining the park as before and added that "the service rendered even
by a private park of this character is municipal in nature[,].... like a fire
department or a police department that traditionally serves the

105. Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The
People and the Poll Tax, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 63, 112 (2009) ("Harper[v. Virginia] served
as the final stage in the process of dynamic triangulation-beginning with the
Twenty-Four[th Amendment] and continuing in [Section] Ten [of the Voting Rights
Act] through which the American people repudiated poll taxes in the 1960s.").
106. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
107. Id. at 666.
108. Id. at 668.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. Id. at669.
111.
382 U.S. 296 (1966).
112. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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community.""' 4 The Court held that the facial change in the park's
administration did not authorize its segregation."'
Brown v. Louisiana similarly involved segregation in a public
domain. The case centered around a small, peaceful protest in a
public library where five African Americans entered, asked for a book
that the library did not have (which the librarian stated would be
ordered), and then just stayed and stood in the building. Shortly
thereafter, the sheriff arrived and asked them to leave. When they
refused, they were arrested for breach of the peace. A five-man
majority was split between overbreadth and asserting that what
occurred was an "appropriate" protest. 116
The Court combated both discrimination based on race and on
political affiliation. The Court invalidated further provisions of the
Subversive Activities Control Act (SACA) in Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board 7 There, the defendant refused to register as a Communist
because doing so would open him up to prosecution under the Smith
Act." 8 Attorney General Tom Clark had seen this problem when the
SACA was first proposed. A unanimous Court upheld Albertson's selfincrimination claim and invalidated the provision requiring Communist
Party members to register as such, because it would violate the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 9
State efforts to rid themselves of Communists took two basic forms.
One was a state version of the House UnAmerican Activities
Committee; the other was a loyalty oath that, in some form, disclaimed
Communist membership. Both of these practices were before the
Court, and in both cases the states lost.
In DeGregory v. New
Hampshire,' the state attorney general was a one-man legislative
investigating committee into communism in the state and was engaged
in his third investigation of the defendant. DeGregory stated in court
that he had not been a member of the Communist Party since 1957
and refused, on First Amendment grounds, to answer any questions
about the time he had been a party member. Justice Douglas did not
114. Evans, 382 U.S. at 301-02.
115. Id. at 301 (holding that "we cannot take judicial notice that the mere substitution
of trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector").
116. Brown, 383 U.S. at 131-32, 139-40, 142-44, 149-51.
117. 382 U.S. 70, 71-72 (1965) (noting that SACA required each member of
every Communist organization to register with the Attorney General and provide

a registration statement).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940) (criminalizing any attempt to overthrow state or
federal government).
119. Albertson, 382 U.S. at 77-78.
120. DeGregory v. New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 830 (1966).
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find any evidence that DeGregory had committed sedition against the
state during the 1960s, and the state's interest in his conduct during
the 1950s was "too remote and conjectural to override the guarantee of
the First Amendment that a person can speak or not, as he chooses,
free of all government compulsion." 2 1
The Court further protected group membership by ruling that for
the legislature to pass a law allowing an employer to ban his employees
based on their membership in subversive groups, the law must be
narrowly tailored to effect only active members who intend to assist in
the groups' unlawful ends.'2 2 Arizona had a loyalty oath backed by
another statute that made it grounds for discharge for a state employee
to be a member of the Communist Party. Because the law did not
distinguish between members of the Party who subscribe to the Party's
illegal aims and members who did not, it "threaten [ed] the cherished
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment."' 2 3 After
all, those who joined the Party "but do not share its unlawful purposes
and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no
threat."'2 4 With these cases, the federal domestic security program was
on life support, and the state programs were dead.
Perhaps more significant than the Term's domestic security cases
were those involving obscenity, two of which, Memoirs v.
Massachusetts2 ' and Ginzburg v. United States,"'2 involved vote swapping
that resulted in blockbuster rulings the Justices did not believe in.
Memoirs, also known as Fanny Hill, the title character in the 1749
novel, was a highly titillating book that pushed the boundaries of
decency. Ginzburg was a sleaze who triggered Attorney General
Robert Kennedy's puritanical streak, but his supposedly obscene
book and magazine were well within the range of what was generally
available for adult consumption. Outside of the Kennedy Justice
Department and the judges on his case, no serious student of
obscenity thought his conviction could stand.12 7 Solicitor General
Thurgood Marshall even directed his assistant, who was arguing the

121. Id. at 830.
122. Elfbrandtv. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17-19 (1966).
123. Id. at 18.
124. Id.at 17.
125. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
126. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
127. See L.A. Powe,Jr., The Obscenity Bargain: Ralph GinzburgforFanny Hill, 35J. Sup.
Cr. HIST. 166, 169-70 (2010) [hereinafter The Obscenity Bargain] (explaining that
literary critics and fine art scholars found Ginzburg's portrayals tasteful, and on appeal,
111 well-known leaders in arts and literature filed an amicus brief on his behalf).
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case, to lose it.'28 But Justice Fortas convinced Justice Brennan to
protect Fanny Hill in exchange for Justice Fortas voting to affirm
Ginzburg's conviction, and that settled the outcome of the two
cases." ' Fanny Hill changed obscenity law by requiring that the
government prove the materials were utterly without redeeming
social value. 1"° Ginzburg allowed conviction for selling supposedly
near-obscene materials if the seller pandered-emphasized the
material's sexual content-in the process.
On the criminal procedure front, Miranda v. Arizona 3' was the
biggest case since Escobedo--probably the biggest criminal procedure
decision of the Warren years. It lacked Escobedo's hostile rhetoric
about confessions and the police, but its four warnings were
unmistakable, and the police were absolutely aghast at the decision.
They claimed the Court was handcuffing the police and coddling
criminals. Miranda would have consequences in the 1966 and 1968
elections that no other case could match.
The Court also sought to protect criminal defendants from the sway
of media in high-publicity cases. In 1955, Cleveland neurosurgeon Dr.
Sam Sheppard was convicted of bludgeoning to death his young,
attractive, pregnant wife in their bedroom. It was one of the "trials of
the century," and the local press was everywhere in the courthouse as
the judge essentially ceded his functions to the press. Justice Clark's
opinion quoted from a judge below: "In this atmosphere of a 'Roman
132
holiday' for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life."
128. Id. at 170, 173 (noting that Justice Marshall believed that the case was
incorrectly decided because the materials, although pornographic, were not out of
the mainstream, and, therefore, were entitled to First Amendment protection).
129. Id. at 166-68, 170, 172-74 ('Justices... bargain over outcomes," and the
decisions in Memoirs and Ginzburg are no different. Justice Fortas favored business
interests and aimed to affirm Ginzburg's conviction in order to exonerate G.P.
Putnam's Sons, the publisher of FANNY HILL, stating that the "nation was about to
turn to another wave of 'book burning."' The result perpetuated "a great injustice"
by denying Ginzburg "equal justice under [the] law").
130. See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (establishing a three-part test for obscenity
jurisprudence, stating that "three elements must coalesce... (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value").
131. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
132. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356 (1966) (quoting Ohio v. Sheppard,
135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ohio 1956)); see also Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press
Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431,

441 (1977) (defining a Roman holiday as a combination of the "deluge of publicity
outside the courtroom" and "disruptive behavior of journalists inside" that

1460

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1443

Among several other errors, while the jurors were sequestered, they
were separated into two groups to pose for photographs, which
appeared in the press. Sheppard and Lee Harvey Oswald, who the
Warren Commission and many scholars believed would not have
received a fair trial for the assassination of President Kennedy, were
instrumental in initiating a decade-long debate over the fairness of
trials involving substantial press coverage. 33
A week after Miranda, Schmerber v. California 4 reaffirmed a 1957
decision 3 5 that a blood sample could be unwillingly taken from a
person without violating the Self-Incrimination Clause. To be sure,
taking blood was "an incriminating product of compulsion," but it
was not testimonial and, therefore, outside the privilege.1 6
Finally, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 3 7 the Court held that its Miranda
decision only applied prospectively to future state law criminal proceedings.
WHERE DOES GRISWOLD FIT?

Griswolds surroundings from the year before to the year after fully
reflect the themes of the mature Warren Court. Griswold fits best in
the sense that it was a liberal decision, and so were most of the others.
Yet, very clearly, birth control was an issue apart from the central
tasks of the Warren Court. While sex is implicit in the use of
contraceptives, Griswold is not a First Amendment case like those

involving obscenity, and it is not a freedom of association case like
those involving Communists. Doctrinally, it is either a right to privacy
(meaning autonomy), substantive due process, or an unenumerated
rights case. Either way, it's an outlier.
Yet Griswold is probably not the biggest outlier discussed.' 38 That
would be Swain v. Alabama, affirming a capital sentence against an
African American defendant by an all-white jury because preemptive
challenges rid the panel of all African Americans.3 9 A core issue of
"inflame[] and prejudice[] the public").
133. After Sheppard's death, DNA evidence matched that of Sheppard's
handyman who was then serving a life sentence for the murder of another
woman. The case became the basis for the television series "The Fugitive" as well
as a later movie by the same name.
134. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
135. Breithauptv. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
136. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
137. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
138. Justin Driver sees Swain not as an outlier, but rather as a part of what he
labeled "The Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court." Justin Driver, The
Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 1101, 1130-36 (2012).
139. 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1980).
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the era was the end to racial discrimination, and yet Alabama-yes,
Alabama, which was at war with the Court and the national
government over segregation-was given a pass. The decision is
more than baffling; it is antithetical to everything else the Court was
doing. Justice Brennan provided the fifth vote, yet his biographers
do not mention this inexplicable decision.140
There was one further outlier-Ginzburgv. United States. To affirm
Ginzburg's conviction, the majority rewrote the federal obscenity
statute to insert a pandering feature, and then had to find Ginzburg
guilty of that new crime, even though he was never charged with it, and
thus had no occasion to defend against it. One of Chief Justice
Warren's law clerks wrote to his boss: "Speaking frankly, sir, my own
feeling is that Ginzburg did get cheated out of a chance to explain. If a
southern court did this to a Negro in a criminal case, I have no doubt
14
But the bargain
the Court would jump in, and with good reason.""
between Justices Brennan and Fortas had been made with ChiefJustice
Warren's approval, and the petition for rehearing was denied.
Perhaps Griswold is not the outlier I have suggested. Another way
of looking at it is that it was near the beginning of an effort to make
poverty (or something thereabouts) a suspect classification for
purposes of constitutional rights. Before Poe v. Ullman was argued, "a
major medical journal, in a story picked up by national newspapers,
quoted Connecticut doctors as explaining how the state law affected
only those citizens too poor to pay private physicians for diaphragm
fittings."142 As Yale law professor Thomas Emerson, the winning
counsel, wrote, "[The law's] enforcement only against birth control
clinics resulted in patent discrimination against persons who were too
poor or too uneducated to seek private medical advice."' 43 After
Griswold, they could become Planned Parenthood patients, and the
possibility existed, as Emerson observed, that questions from the
44
Bench about equal protection "carrie [d] a portent for the future."'
Harper, with its equation of wealth distinctions with racial
distinctions, was a further move towards creating Emerson's portent
and what Frank Michelman in his 1969 Harvard Foreword saw as a

140.

See generally SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN:

CHAMPION

LIBERAL

(2010).

141. Memorandum from Law Clerk to Chief Justice Warren (Apr. 25, 1966) (on
file in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, box 277, file: Ginzburg v. United
States) (quoted in The Obscenity Bargain,supra note 127, at 172).
142. THE WARREN COURT, supra note 3, at 447.
143. Emerson, supra note 91, at 219.
144. Id. at 221.
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constitutional shield for the poor from "the most elemental
consequences of poverty: lack of funds to exchange for needed
goods, services, or privileges of access." 1" 5 In my study of the Warren
Court, I concluded Mirandaas follows:
"Not since Gideon [v. Wainirright]146 and Douglas [v. California]147
had a decision been so focused on the differences between the
affluent and the poor. If the police stopped a man of means and
wished to interrogate him as a suspect, the first thing he would do
was demand to speak to his lawyer. By that very demand he would
be spared, first, the indignities of the interrogation room and,
second, being convicted for having confessed (since his lawyer
would ensure that he would not incriminate himself if the police
did not have their case). But the poor, equally obviously, did not
have their own lawyers and did not know that they had the right to
refuse to speak to the police. Itjust wasn't fair.""' 8
The Court's decisions were contemporaneous with President
Lyndon B. Johnson's launching the War on Poverty and the initial
Congressional anti-poverty legislation as the Nation seemed poised to
improve the lives of the least well-off. In this context, Johnson's
assertion to historian William Leuchtenburg is telling:
"[N]ever
before have the three independent branches [of the federal
government] been so productive."149
Harper, Miranda, Griswold, and maybe a couple of other lesserknown cases addressed the advantages of the "haves" over the "havenots"; yet nothing again as explicit as Harper. Perhaps no wonder;
this was before the continuous summer race riots and the
wonderment that escalation in Vietnam was not having its desired
effects. The idea of a constitutional shield from poverty was dying
just as Michelman was writing.
Richard Nixon bested Hubert
Humphrey and was to be blessed with four appointments in his first
term (more than any subsequent two term president).
With the
changed composition of the Court, United States v. Kras5 ° and San

145. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Anndment, 83 HARv.L. REV. 7,9 (1969).
146. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
147. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
148. THE WARREN COURT, supra note 3 at 397-98.
149. ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND His TIMES 19611973 278 (1998).
150. 409 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1973) (holding that bankruptcy is not a fundamental
right, and that fees imposed by the Bankruptcy Act do not rise to a level warranting
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez'5 ' put an end to what
may or may not have been a new theme for the Court. And Griswold
became what it may have always been: a right to privacy case.
CONCLUSION:

GRISWOLD, ME,

AND THE HARVARD LAWREVIEW

Connecticut's anti-contraception statute at the Court matched my
early years. The Court decided Tileston the year I was born; Poe the
year I graduated from high school; and Griswold the year I graduated
from a small Connecticut college, married my wife, and entered law
school. The first law school final I took was in the Legal Process out
of Hart and Sachs's mimeographed 1958 tentative edition. 1 2 The
course was taught by the dean, who was incomprehensible even in private
conversation. Despite Hart and Sacks eschewing constitutional law, the
final exam had Griswold as a question. 153 By a statistically significant
margin, I got my lowest grade in law school.
Perhaps if I had been at Harvard I would have known better. In the
Supreme Court issue of the Harvard Law Review's Note on Griswold, the
writers, in the best footnote ever in Law Review history observed: "Despite
the practice of illegal fornication by Americans of all descriptions
' 54
throughout our history, the United States has never lost a war." 1
Attending a non-elite law school, I would never have thought of that.
America's victory streak in wars would soon be over. But Griswolds
right to privacy became central to the battles over abortion, which
seemingly have no end. And to the shock of many, the
issue
of
contraception reemerged in the wake of the Supreme Court's
validation of President Obama's Affordable Care Act.

151. 411 U.S. 1, 18, 35, 40, 55 (1973) (holding that states are not required to
allocate local property tax revenues to benefit all students equally, because the
Constitution did not guarantee a right to public education).
152.

Now

HENRY

M. HART,JR. &

ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

BASIC

(William N. Eskridge, Jr. &

Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
153. 'The Legal Process' as a first year course and 'Constitutional Law' reserved
for the second year? What rational law school could do that? Not Harvard, where
The Legal Process was an upper level course.
154. Note, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. Rv. 103, 165 n.22 (1965).

